Two Faces of Janus in the District Courts: Is Liability for Securities Fraud under Section 17(a) Limited to Actors with Ultimate Authority over Untrue Statements by Arnold, Andrew P.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 91 | Number 3 Article 8
3-1-2013
Two Faces of Janus in the District Courts: Is
Liability for Securities Fraud under Section 17(a)
Limited to Actors with Ultimate Authority over
Untrue Statements
Andrew P. Arnold
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Andrew P. Arnold, Two Faces of Janus in the District Courts: Is Liability for Securities Fraud under Section 17(a) Limited to Actors with
Ultimate Authority over Untrue Statements, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 1054 (2013).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol91/iss3/8
Two Faces of Janus in the District Courts: Is Liability for
Securities Fraud Under Section 17(a) Limited to Actors with
"Ultimate Authority" over Untrue Statements?*
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Janus Capital Group,
Inc. v. First Derivative Traders' has been derided by some
commentators as a way for perpetrators of securities fraud to avoid
liability.2 Others have embraced the decision as a much-needed
limitation on plaintiffs' attorneys' ability to extract settlements from
companies for meritless litigation. In Janus, the Court created a new
restriction on who may be held liable under SEC Rule 10b-54 for
making materially misleading statements.5 Rule lOb-5, promulgated
under the authority of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ("Exchange Act"),' is a general anti-fraud provision that bans
the use of certain "manipulative and deceptive devices" in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities.'
It has long been established that parties who knowingly assist
primary violators but do not themselves employ a manipulative
device or make a material misstatement cannot be held liable as
primary violators under Rule 10b-5. The distinction between primary
and secondary liability is significant; while the SEC may bring Rule
10b-5 claims against aiders and abettors, the private right of action is
* @ 2013 Andrew P. Arnold.
1. 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
2. See, e.g., Elizabeth Cosenza, Is the Third Time the Charm? Janus and the Proper
Balance Between Primary and Secondary Actor Liability Under Section 10(b), 33
CARDOZO L. REV. 1019, 1073 (2012) (arguing that the Court's theory "would provide a
blueprint for widespread immunity from securities violations").
3. A Thwarted Liability Scheme, WALL ST. J., June 14,2011, at A14 ("The Supremes
dismiss another plaintiffs bar money raid-barely.").
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
5. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302-03 (holding that "[the Court] will not expand liability
beyond the person or entity that ultimately has authority over a false statement").
6. Pub. L. No 73-291 § 10, 48 Stat. 881, 891 (1934) (current version at 15 U.S.C.§ 78j(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011)).
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
8. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164, 191 (1994).
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limited to primary violators.' In practice, the line between primary
and secondary actors is often unclear. 0
In Janus, decided in June 2011, the Court announced a new
standard for distinguishing between primary and secondary liability
for misstatements in Rule lOb-5 actions." The Court held that parties
may be held primarily liable only where they have "ultimate authority
over the [allegedly untrue] statement, including its content and
whether and how to communicate it."' This narrow construction of
Rule 10b-5 immunizes lawyers, accountants, investment bankers, and
others who knowingly assist in the creation of materially false
statements, but who do not have ultimate authority over the
statements.' 3 Janus thus restricts the cast of characters against whom
a Rule lOb-5 lawsuit can be maintained.
Following Janus, several district courts have been asked to
decide whether the "ultimate authority" standard also applies to
claims brought under section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933
("Securities Act"), a similar anti-fraud provision that applies to the
offer and sale of securities." Section 17(a) claims have previously
been held to have "essentially the same elements" as Rule lOb-5
claims, although there is no private right of action under section
17(a)." While some courts have smiled on extending the rule in Janus16 hin this way, others have frowned upon the idea." For example, in
SEC v. Daifotis," a district court in the Northern District of
California held that Janus did not apply to section 17(a).19 But, in
SEC v. Kelly,20 a district court in the Northern District of New York
9. Id. ("Because the text of § 10(b) does not prohibit aiding and abetting, we hold
that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b).").
10. Cosenza, supra note 2, at 1022.
11. See id. at 1066.
12. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296,2302 (2011).
13. See id.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). See infra note 74 for the text of section
17(a).
15. SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1467 (2d Cir. 1996).
16. See, e.g., SEC v. Perry, No. CV-11-1309 R, 2012 WL 1959566, at *8 (C.D. Cal. May
31, 2012); SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
17. See, e.g., SEC v. Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc., No. 07 C4684, 2012 WL 1079961, at
*14-15 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2012) (refusing to apply Janus to 17(a)); SEC v. Geswein, No.
5:10CV1235, 2011 WL 4565861, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 29,2011) (allowing a 17(a) claim to
proceed against defendant whom the SEC conceded was not the "maker" of an allegedly
false financial statement).
1& No. C 11-00137 WHA, 2011 WL 3295139 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011), modified on
reconsideration, 2011 WL 3295139 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011).
19. Id. at *5-6.
20. 817 F. Supp. 2d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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held that Janus injected the "ultimate authority" requirement into
17(a).21
This Recent Development argues that limiting section 17(a)
liability for untrue statements to individuals with "ultimate authority"
over those statements is not supported by the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Janus. The Court provided three justifications for
imposing an ultimate authority requirement. First, the Court pointed
to the use of the word "make" in the text of Rule 10b-5, but this word
"is absent from the operative language of Section 17(a)."22 Second,
the Janus Court cited the need to interpret the private remedy
narrowly to protect business from vexatious, private litigation, but
section 17(a) lacks a private remedy. Finally, the Court cited the need
to preserve the distinction between primary and secondary actors to
provide certainty as to who might be held liable under Rule 10b-5;
however, section 17(a) liability is not limited to primary actors.
Analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I begins with an
introduction to Rule 10b-5, followed by a description of the facts and
holding in Janus, as well as a discussion of the case's impact on the
scope of the rule. Part II introduces section 17(a) of the Securities Act
and describes the disagreement in the district courts over the
applicability of Janus to claims made under that statute. Last, Part III
applies the Supreme Court's analysis in Janus to section 17(a),
including a textual interpretation of the statute and the Court's policy
interests in limiting the reach of Rule 10b-5.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Rule 10b-5
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act" gives the SEC rulemaking
authority to proscribe the use of "any manipulative or deceptive
21. Id. at 345.
22. Daifotis, 2011 WL 3295139, at *5.
23. The full text of Rule 10b-5 is as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
1056 [Vol. 91
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device or contrivance" when "in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security." 2 4 By enacting the Exchange Act, Congress sought to
"promote investor confidence" in the securities markets by
mandating full disclosure by companies rather than having the
government judge the merits of individual investments.25 Rule lOb-5,
promulgated under the authority of section 10(b), makes it illegal to
"employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" under subpart
(a), "make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact" under subpart (b), or "engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person" under subpart (c).2 6 The SEC may bring suit
against primary violators of Rule lOb-5 and against those who
knowingly or recklessly provide substantial assistance to primary
violators.27 Courts have also recognized an implied right of action for
private plaintiffs under Rule lOb-5. 28 However, the implied private
right of action only reaches primary violators, so a private plaintiff
may not bring suit against a defendant who merely assists a
violation. 9
The requirements for proving a violation of Rule lOb-5 vary
depending on whether the suit is brought by a private plaintiff or the
SEC. A private plaintiff generally must establish: "(1) a material
misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a
connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the
purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
25. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) ("Congress sought 'to substitute a
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high
standard of business ethics in the securities industry.' " (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens of
Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972))).
26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) ("[Alny person that knowingly or
recklessly provides substantial assistance to another person in violation of a provision of
this chapter, or of any rule or regulation issued under this chapter, shall be deemed to be
in violation of such provision to the same extent as the person to whom such assistance is
provided.").
28. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) ("It is
now established that a private right of action is implied under § 10(b).").
29. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164, 191 (1994) ("Because the text of § 10(b) does not prohibit aiding and abetting, we
hold that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b).").
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or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.""o In contrast,
the SEC need only establish the first three elements."' To be held
liable for an untrue statement or material omission under subpart (b)
of Rule 10b-5, a defendant must also have "made" the allegedly
misleading statement." Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Janus, the circuits developed conflicting standards for determining
whether a defendant was a "maker" of a statement, so the scope of
subpart (b) was often unclear. 3 Defendants may also be held liable
under subparts (a) and (c), often referred to as "scheme liability."'
Neither of these provisions requires the defendant to have made a
statement.35 However, their use has been circumscribed by the courts
to prevent plaintiffs bypassing the "make" requirement. 6 This Recent
30. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008).
31. For this reason, outcomes under Rule 10b-5 may vary depending on the identity of
the plaintiff. See Donald C. Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully: A Duty-Based
Approach to Reliance and Third-Party Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
2125, 2127-28 (2010) ("The [Stoneridge] Court's choice of reliance as the crucial element
indicates the Court's comfort with having different liability outcomes in Rule 10b-5 cases
depending on whether the action is an SEC enforcement or criminal prosecution (where
reliance is not required) or private litigation (where it is).").
32. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 225 n.5 (1980) ("Only Rules 10b-5(a)
and (c) are at issue here.... The portion of the indictment based on [(b)] was dismissed
because the petitioner made no statements at all in connection with the purchase of stock."
(emphasis added)).
33. See, e.g., In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 121 (4th Cir. 2009) (concluding
that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that "defendants made the statements in question by
participating in the preparation of the prospectuses"), rev'd sub nom. Janus Capital Grp.,
Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011); Ziemba v. Cascade Int'l, Inc., 256
F.3d 1194, 1205 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that statements are not actionable unless they
were "publicly attributable to the defendant at the time"); In re Enron Corp. Sec.,
Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 588-91 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (adopting the
rule that a defendant can be held liable where he "creates a misrepresentation"); see also
Robert John Grubb II, Attorneys, Accountants, and Bankers, Oh My! Primary Liability for
Secondary Actors in the Wake of Stoneridge, 62 VAND. L. REV. 275, 287-91 (2009)
(describing tests used by the various circuits).
34. SEC v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 342, 350 n.5 (D.N.J. 2009).
35. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 664-66 (1997) (reversing a holding that
"§ 10(b) covers only deceptive statements or omissions"); see also Affiliated Ute Citizens
of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1972) (noting that while "the second
subparagraph of the rule specifies the making of an untrue statement of a material fact
and the omission to state a material fact[,] [t]he first and third subparagraphs are not so
restricted").
36. Nicholas Fortune Schanbaum, Scheme Liability: Rule 10b-5(a) and Secondary
Actor Liability After Central Bank, 26 REv. LITIG. 183, 205-22 (2007). But see SEC v.
Sells, No. C 11-4941 CW, 2012 WL 3242551, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2012) (rejecting
defendants' argument that SEC must allege that defendants "made" misleading
statements where defendants were "architects of a fraudulent scheme" that was
"communicated to the public"); SEC v. Geswein, No. 5:10CV1235, 2011 WL 4541308, at
*17 n.3 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 2,2011) (allowing Rule 10b-5 claim to proceed under (a) and (c)
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Development primarily addresses Rule 10b-5 liability under subpart
(b). The next section discusses the Supreme Court's decision in Janus,
in which it enunciated a new standard for determining who is a
"maker" of a statement in a claim brought under subpart (b).
B. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders
The defendant, Janus Capital Group, Inc. ("JCG"), was a
publicly traded financial services company that created the Janus
Investment Fund, a special purpose vehicle organized as a
Massachusetts business trust, to hold a family of mutual funds." Janus
Investment Fund was owned exclusively by investors in the mutual
funds and had a legal existence apart from JCG."8 JCG was solely
responsible for managing the mutual funds through a wholly-owned
subsidiary,39 and all of Janus Investment Fund's seventeen officers
were vice presidents of JCG.40
In 2003, the Attorney General for the State of New York filed a
lawsuit against JCG, alleging that it had allowed market timing
trading in its mutual funds.4 1 Market timing enables traders to profit
from price movements in some of a fund's stocks outside of regular
market hours-for example, foreign stocks traded on markets that
open and close at different times.4 2 Market timing harms existing
mutual fund investors by depriving them of profits. 43
Soon after the announcement of the Attorney General's lawsuit,
the market price of JCG's common stock declined significantly, and
owners of the stock brought a Rule 10b-5 claim against the company
and its wholly owned subsidiary, Janus Capital Management LLC
("JCM")." The plaintiff-shareholders alleged that JCG and JCM
made false statements of material fact, that they bought Janus
common stock in reliance on these statements, and that they
sustained significant losses as a result of the false statements. 45 The
statements in question appeared in the prospectuses of several Janus
although SEC conceded that defendant "did not actually make any false statement"),
overruled by No. 5:10CV1235, 2011 WL 4565861, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2011).
37. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2299 (2011).
38. Id.
39. Id. The subsidiary was named Janus Capital Management. Id.
40. Id. at 2312 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that the Fund had no employees who
were not also employees of Janus).
41. Id. at 2300 (majority opinion).
42. Id. at 2300 n.1.
43. Id. at 2300.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
2013] 1059
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Investment Fund mutual funds and represented that the funds'
investment advisor, JCM, would act to prevent market timing in the
funds. 6 The prospectuses were written in large part by JCM's
employees and distributed via JCG's website The district court
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim on the grounds
that the companies did not "make" the allegedly misleading
statements since the statements appeared in prospectuses issued by a
separate legal entity, Janus Investment Fund.'
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reinstated the Rule 10b-5 claim
and held that the defendants could be held liable if "interested
investors would have inferred that [defendants] played a substantial
role in drafting or approving the allegedly misleading prospectuses." 4 9
Under this standard, any person a plaintiff reasonably believes
substantially participated in creating or approving a statement would
be considered to have "made" the statement even if it cannot be
directly attributed to the person.50 Thus, the expectations and
understandings of investors control the scope of primary liability for
Rule lOb-5(b). Applying this standard to the facts of the case, the
Fourth Circuit held that since "an investment advisor is well known to
be intimately involved in the day-to-day operations of the mutual
funds it manages," JCM could be held liable as a maker of the
statements in the prospectuses issued by the Janus Investment Fund.
On the other hand, the Court found that JCG could not be held
primarily liable since "it would [not] be apparent to the investing
public that the investment advisor's parent company ... participates
in the drafting or approving of prospectuses. "52
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Thomas,
reversed the Fourth Circuit and again dismissed the 10b-5 claim."
The Court rejected a standard based on the expectations and
understandings of investors and instead held that "the maker of a
statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority over the
statement, including its content and whether and how to
46. Id. Plaintiffs alleged that these statements, not the market timing itself, violated
Rule 10b-5. Id.
47. Id. at 2312.
48. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 487 F. Supp. 2d 618, 621-22 (4th Cir. 2007), rev'd, 566
F.3d 111 (2009), rev'd sub norn. Janus, 131 S. Ct. 2296.
49. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 124 (4th Cir. 2009).
50. See id. at 123-34.
51. Id. at 127-28.
52. Id. at 128. The Court did find that the parent company might be held liable as a
"control person" under section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. Id. at 131.
53. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2299.
1060 [Vol. 91
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communicate it."54 The Court argued that this requirement was
necessary to preserve its decision in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,ss in which the Court held that
private parties may not bring 10b-5 suits against aiders and abettors.s6
The Janus Court reasoned that allowing suits against persons without
ultimate authority over a statement would eviscerate the line between
principal and secondary actors, rendering meaningless the limitation
imposed by Central Bank." Citing its decision in Stoneridge
Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc," the Court also
reasoned that the plaintiff could not have relied on JCM's
"undisclosed deceptive acts" since its participation did not make it
'"necessary or inevitable" that the alleged misstatements would
appear in prospectuses over whose content Janus Investment Fund
had ultimate authority.s9
C. Scope of Rule 10b-5(b) Liability After Janus
1. Creators of Statements
In Janus, the Supreme Court held that only defendants with
"ultimate authority" over statements may be found liable under
subpart (b) of Rule 10b-5.6o Thus, liability in a private suit does not
attach to persons who aid in the preparation of statements, such as
accountants, lawyers, investment bankers, and others who provide
professional services, but who do not exercise ultimate authority over
the content of statements released to the public.6 1 The Court
explicitly rejected the plaintiff's argument that the word "make"
should be treated as synonymous with "create," so that any person
who authored a statement could be held liable for its content under
54. Id. at 2302 (emphasis added).
55. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
56. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302; Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 180.
57. See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
58. 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
59. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303 (observing that "dismissal of [a] complaint [is] proper
[where] the public could not have relied on the entities' undisclosed deceptive acts" (citing
Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 166-67)). This reasoning may have surprised some commentators
who had forcefully argued that Stoneridge did not eliminate Rule 10b-5 secondary liability
for attorneys, accountants, investment bankers, and others who toil in obscurity. See, e.g.,
Ronald J. Colombo, Cooperation with Securities Fraud, 61 ALA. L. REV. 61, 119 (2009)
("Stoneridge did not foreclose liability on the part of secondary actors who manage to
remain anonymous participants in securities fraud.").
60. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
61. See id.
10612013]
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10b-5.62 Instead, a person who "creates" a statement, such as a
speechwriter who writes a speech, would not be liable under the
standard enunciated by the Court because the "content is entirely
within the control of the person who delivers" the speech.' Nor is
authorship a prerequisite for liability, so a speaker might be held
liable for misstatements where he did not create the statements, yet
had ultimate authority over their content.'
2. Corporate Insiders
The Court in Janus noted that, as a legally separate entity, JCG
was an outsider.65 Yet the Court did not distinguish between outsiders
and insiders when formulating its new rule.66 Accordingly, district
courts have consistently interpreted the ultimate authority standard
to apply to corporate insiders, potentially shielding them from
liability for misrepresentations they took part in creating or
approving where they lacked "ultimate authority." Thus, Janus
62. Id. at 2303-04.
63. Id. at 2302 (emphasis added).
64. See, e.g., SEC v. Carter, No. 10 C 6145, 2011 WL 5980966, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28,
2011) (finding that a defendant CEO who approved false press releases "had ultimate
authority for the statements and 'made' them for purposes of Janus" although he did not
write them).
65. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304 ("We decline this invitation to disregard the corporate
form."). But cf id. at 2312 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "particular
circumstances" of Janus's very close relationship with Janus Investment Fund called for
liability).
66. Id. at 2303 (majority opinion) ("[Wie will not expand liability beyond the person
or entity that ultimately has authority over a false statement." (emphasis added)); id. at
2302 n.6 ("[Tlhe maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimately authority over
the statement." (emphasis added)). Note that, despite the Janus Court's strong rhetoric
and its use of the singular, more than one entity or person may still be liable for a
materially misleading statement or omission under 10b-5. Where multiple parties have
"ultimate authority over the [allegedly untrue] statement, including its content and
whether and how to communicate it," multiple parties can be liable under Rule 10b-5 so
long as they meet the other requirements for liability under that rule. Id. at 2306; cf Cent.
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994)
("In any complex securities fraud ... there are likely to be multiple violators .... ").
Otherwise, corporate officers could avoid Rule 10b-5 liability by distributing decision-
making. Such a rule would be a radical modification of the private action under Rule 10b-
5, rather than a refusal to "expand" the private right of action. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303.
67. See, e.g., Haw. Ironworkers Annuity Trust Fund v. Cole, No. 3:10CV371, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98760, at *8-10 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 2, 2011) (stating that corporate officers
who provided false financial figures to the corporation's executives could not be held
liable under Rule 10b-5 where they lacked ultimate authority over the financial reports
and SEC filings into which the figures were later incorporated); accord Local 703, I.B. of
T. Grocery & Food Emp. Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp., No. CV: 10-2847-IPJ, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93873, at *2-3 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 23, 2011) (applying an ultimate authority
standard to corporate insiders).
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entrenches broad Rule 10b-5 immunity for corporate officers who
lack the requisite level of control.
3. Liability in SEC Actions
Finally, although the decision in Janus was premised in part on
the need to limit the private right of action, it is apparent from the
plain language of the opinion that the ultimate authority requirement
also applies to claims brought by the SEC.6 This would not seem to
be a significant limitation for the SEC since, unlike private parties,
the Commission may bring 10b-5 actions on an accessory or control
person theory."9 For example, where A purposely creates false
statements and passes them on to B who then "makes" the statements
(in the sense meant by Janus) by approving their content and
releasing them to the public, the SEC could not hold A primarily
liable since he did not "make" the statement. But the SEC could
nevertheless hold A (the creator) liable as an accessory where A does
not legally control B (the maker), and liable as a control person
where A does legally control B.
However, the dissent in Janus identified a "loophole" in the
ultimate authority rule in which no party would be liable under 10b-5
for a fraudulent statement." If A used B as an innocent conduit for a
fraudulent statement created by A, then B could not be primarily
liable for fraud since he would be unaware of the false nature of the
statement and, therefore, would lack the requisite scienter. Since
there would be no primary violation to which secondary liability
could attach, A could not be held liable as an aider and abettor."
Finally, unless A controlled B, there could be no control person
liability either. In this way, A might avoid liability for a fraudulent
statement. In fact, this was arguably the situation in Janus, where
JCM allegedly created false statements and caused them to be placed
in the prospectuses of the mutual funds, while the directors of Janus
Investment Fund were likely unaware that the statements were
false." Applying the ultimate authority standard, JCM was liable
68. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302 ("For purposes of Rule 10b-5, the maker of a statement is
the person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and
whether and how to communicate it.").
69. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
70. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2311 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's rule
may introduce a "loophole" in the securities laws).
71. Id. at 2312 (criticizing the majority for creating a rule in which perpetrators of
fraud might escape liability by "us[ing] innocent persons as conduits through which
false statements reach the public").
72. Id.
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under Rule 10b-5 neither as a primary violator, a secondary violator,
nor a control person.'
A final question is the effect of the Janus ruling on claims
brought by the SEC under section 17(a) of the Securities Act, a
similar general anti-fraud provision. This question is important since
applying Janus to section 17(a) would limit the scope of 17(a) in the
same ways it has limited the scope of 10b-5. Part II introduces section
17(a) and briefly discusses the disagreement among district courts
over Janus's applicability to claims brought under that section.
II. DISAGREEMENT OVER THE APPLICABILITY OF JANUS
TO SECTION 17(A)
A. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act
Section 17(a) is a general anti-fraud provision that applies to the
offer and sale of securities.74 Section 17(a) claims have previously
been held to have "essentially the same elements" as Rule 10b-5
claims15-a function of their shared foundation in common law fraud
and similar text." In fact, the SEC adapted the text of Rule 10b-5
from the text of section 17(a).17 Like Rule 10b-5, the text of section
73. Id. at 2304-05 (majority opinion).
74. The full text of section 17(a) is as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities (including
security-based swaps) or any security-based swap agreement (as defined in section
3(a)(78) of the Securities Exchange Act) by use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the
mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading; or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
75. SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1467 (2d Cir. 1996).
76. See infra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
77. Remarks of Milton Freedman on Administrative Procedures (Nov. 18-19, 1966),
in Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793, 922 (1967)
[hereinafter Freedman Remarks]. An SEC attorney recounted the creation of Rule 10b-5
in 1943: "I looked at Section 10(b) and I looked at Section 17, and I put them together
.Id.; see also Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1952)
(recounting the history of the adoption of Rule 10b-5).
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17(a) is organized into three subparts, but the subparts are identified
by numbers rather than letters. Subpart (2) is analogous to subpart
(b) of Rule 1Ob-5 and makes it "unlawful for any person in the offer
or sale of any securities .. . to obtain money or property by means of
any untrue statement of a material fact."" Therefore, unlike Rule
10b-5, section 17(a) applies to offers and sales of securities, rather
than to sales and purchases of securities. Thus, 17(a) is both narrower
than 10b-5, in that it applies to purchases, and broader than 10b-5, in
that it applies to fraudulent offers to sell that are never
consummated.80 Finally, courts have not granted an implied private
right of action under 17(a).81
B. District Court Decisions Since Janus
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Janus, several district
courts have ruled on the applicability of that decision to section 17(a)
anti-fraud claims.Y This Recent Development focuses on SEC v.
Daifotis83 and SEC v. KellyM as representative of these district court
decisions. Both Daifotis and Kelly followed soon after the Supreme
Court's decision in Janus and together include the major arguments
for whether Janus should or should not limit the scope of section
17(a). The facts and holdings of Daifotis and Kelly are summarized in
the next two subsections.
1. SEC v. Daifotis
In Daifotis, decided in August 2011, the SEC sued a portfolio
manager (Daifotis) and an executive (Merk) of subsidiaries of the
Charles Schwab Corporation, for allegedly making misleading
statements related to an ultra-short bond fund to "portray [it] as a
safe 'cash-alternative' or 'cash-equivalent' investment," as well as
other misstatements about the way the fund was run and large
78. § 77q(a).
79. Id.
80. Although section 17(a) is a part of the 1933 Securities Act, its reach is not limited
to public offerings; like Rule lOb-5, it extends to aftermarket transactions. See United
States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768,777-78 (1979).
81. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Dominguez, 137 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1998); Zink v. Merrill
Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 13 F.3d 330, 334 (10th Cir. 1993); In re Wash. Pub.
Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349, 1357-58 (9th Cir. 1987).
82. See sources cited supra notes 16-17 (noting relevant district court cases).
83. No. C 11-00137 WHA, 2011 WL 3295139 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011), modified on
reconsideration, 2011 WL 3295139 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011).
84. 765 F. Supp. 2d 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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declines in the fund's value.' The District Court for the Northern
District of California dismissed the 17(a) claim against defendant
Merk because it relied on subpart (2), yet failed to allege that Merk
had "obtained money or property" as the text of the statute
requires." Following the Supreme Court's decision in Janus, the
district court granted defendants' motion for reconsideration. On
rehearing, defendant Daifotis argued that the 17(a) claim against him
should also be dismissed because, although he helped draft
statements, he lacked ultimate authority over their content and thus
was not a "maker" of any statement.87
The court denied Daifotis's motion to dismiss the 17(a) claim,
finding the Janus decision inapplicable to that statute. The court
based its decision, first, on a textual construction of section 17(a).89
Since the "operative language" was different from Rule 10b-5, the
court reasoned that the same textual construction could not be used.90
Second, the court pointed out that the Supreme Court's "stringent
reading of the word 'make' " was based on precedent limiting the
reach of the private right of action.91 Since section 17(a) lacks a
private right of action, the court reasoned that the "same rationale
does not apply" to that statute."
2. SEC v. Kelly
In Kelly, decided in September 2011, the SEC sued three former
executives of America Online ("AOL"), alleging that between 2000
and 2003 they caused AOL to enter into fraudulent "round trip" or
"concurrent" transactions with several counterparties, which
"improperly inflated [AOL's] advertising revenue by directly or
indirectly funding another company's purchase of online
advertising."93 For example, the SEC alleged that two of the
executives were involved in the negotiation of a plan by which AOL
would make a $39.2 million payment to WorldCom with the
understanding that $34.2 million would be used to purchase
85. Daifotis, No. C 11-0137 WHA, 2011 WL 2183314, at *1-2.
86. Id. at *10.
87. Notice of Motion and Defendant Kimon P. Daifotis's Motion for Reconsideration
of Certain Portions of the Court's June 6,2011 Order Denying His Motion to Dismiss at 1,
3, Daifotis, 2011 WL 3295139.
8& Daifotis, 2011 WL 3295139, at *5-6.
89. Id.
90. Id. at *5.
91. Id. at *6.
92. Id.
93. SEC v. Kelly, 765 F. Supp. 2d 301,305 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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advertising from AOL.94 AOL then recognized the funds from these
round trip transactions as revenue, causing AOL's financial
statements to overstate revenue.95
The SEC alleged violations of Rule 10b-5 and section 17(a) of
the Exchange Act by each of the executives. 6 The district court in the
Southern District of New York dismissed the 10b-5 claim, finding that
the executives could not be liable under subpart (b) of Rule 10b-5
since they did not have ultimate authority over the misstatements and
thus were not the makers of the fraudulent statements pursuant to
Janus.97 The court also found that the executives could not be liable
under subparts (a) or (c) of Rule 10b-5 since "the primary purpose
and effect of [their] purported scheme [was] to make a public
misrepresentation or omission."" Next, the court dismissed the 17(a)
claim, holding that the executives could not be held liable under
section 17(a) either since they were not makers of the
misstatements." The court argued that Janus's ultimate authority
standard applies equally to 17(a) because section 17(a) and Rule 10b-
5 have the same "functional meaning when it comes to creating
primary liability.""c The court concluded that the two provisions have
the same "functional meaning" based on both precedent that stated
that "the elements of a claim under Section 17(a) are 'essentially the
same' as those for claims under Rule 10b-5" and on the SEC's
purported intent in formulating Rule 10b-5.1ot
III. APPLYING THE COURT'S REASONING IN JANUS TO
SECTION 17(A)
In Janus, the Supreme Court used a four-part analysis to decide
that liability under Rule 10b-5(b) required "ultimate authority" over
a misstatement. First, the Court looked at the text of the statute to see
what behavior it proscribes on its face."0 Second, the Court
considered the need to distinguish between primary and secondary
violators in order to preserve its decision in Central Bank, in which it
held that there is no Rule 10b-5 private right of action against aiders
94. Id. at 313-14.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 318.
97. SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
98. Id. at 343; see also sources cited supra note 36.
99. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 345.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011).
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and abettors.10 Third, the Court considered the effect of its recent
decision in Stoneridge, in which it held that Rule 10b-5's reliance
element was not satisfied where plaintiff was not privy to defendants'
deceptive acts.'" Finally, the Court considered the need to limit the
scope of the Rule 10b-5 private right of action.105 The Court's
methodology offers a blueprint for analyzing whether liability under
section 17(a) also requires "ultimate authority." This Part considers
each of the Supreme Court's arguments in turn and concludes that
they do not apply with the same force to claims made under section
17(a).
A. Textual Interpretation of Section 17(a)
The Court began its analysis by construing the text of subsection
(b) of the rule, which makes it unlawful to "make any untrue
statement of a material fact."106 Initially, the Court concluded that the
meaning of the phrase "to make a statement" was the same as "to
state."' For this construction, the Court relied on one of the
definitions of "make" in an edition of the Oxford English Dictionary
("OED") dating from the time of the passage of the Securities Act."
The Court reasoned that the maker of a statement is the "person or
entity with ultimate authority" because "[w]ithout control, a person
or entity can merely suggest what to say, not 'make' a statement in its
own right."" The question then is whether the Court's reasoning
here applies equally to section 17(a).
The text of subsection 17(a)(2)"I is analogous to the text of
subsection (b) of Rule 10b-5; however, the wording differs
somewhat."' Notably, subsection 17(a)(2) does not make it unlawful
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2303.
105. Id.
106. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2012).
107. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302 ("To make any... statement, is thus the approximate
equivalent of 'to state.' ").
10& Id. ("When 'make' is paired with a noun expressing the action of a verb, the
resulting phrase is 'approximately equivalent in sense' to that verb." (quoting 6 OXFORD
ENGLISH DIcTIONARY 66 (1st ed. 1933))).
109. Id. The dissent in Janus casts doubt on the majority's construction of the word
"make": "The English language does not impose upon the word 'make' boundaries of the
kind the majority finds determinative." Id. at 2307 (Breyer, J., dissenting). This discussion
fully accepts the majority's construction as a matter of settled law.
110. See supra note 74.
111. See supra Part II.A.
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to "make any untrue statement of material fact."n 2 Instead,
subsection 17(a)(2) makes it unlawful to "obtain money or property
by means of any untrue statement of a material fact.""' The text
focuses on the action of "obtain[ing] money or property" rather than
the action of "mak[ing] a statement." The phrase used to refer to the
"untrue statement" is "by means of," which does not have the same
meaning as "make." 14 According to the OED, which the Supreme
Court relied on in Janus, "by means of" is equivalent to "[b]y the
agency or instrumentality of.""' The OED gives the following
example usage from Encyclopedia Britannica: "The connexion is not
made directly, but translation is secured by means of an induction
coil."" 6 In other words, "by means of" is equivalent to "by the use
of." The phrase "by means of" does not denote that the statement
must have been "made" by the person who uses it to "obtain money
or property" since one need not make an instrument in order to use
it.
The court in Kelly held that a requirement that the defendant
"made" an allegedly misleading statement should be read into
subsection (2) of section 17(a)." 7 The court based this conclusion on
judicial precedent and the SEC's intention in creating Rule 10b-5.111
First, the court noted that "numerous courts have held that the
elements of a claim under section 17(a) are 'essentially the same' as
those for claims under Rule 10b-5."'11 Yet this argument is not very
persuasive, as the courts have treated Rule 10b-5 and section 17(a)
differently where appropriate. 120 For example, the Supreme Court has
held that the SEC need not establish scienter under subsections (a)(2)
or (a)(3) of section 17.121 The Court grounded this decision in the
112. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011), with 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2012).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a).
114. Id.
115. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/115436?rskey
=KFqp5x&result=3#eid (last visited Feb. 24,2013) (subscription required).
116. Id. (citing ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA XXXIII 236/1 (1902)).
117. SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ("Because subsection (2)
of Section 17(a) and subsection (b) of Rule 10b-5 are treated similarly, it would be
inconsistent for Janus to require that a defendant have made the misleading statement to




120. See supra Part II.A.
121. SEC v. Monarch Funding Corp., 192 F.3d 295, 308 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[Nlo showing
of scienter is required for the SEC to obtain an injunction under subsections (a)(2) or
(a)(3)."). Scienter is required under (a)(1) because the use of the word "defraud" in the
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function of section 17(a).122 Also, the courts have granted an implied
private right of action under Rule 10b-5, but not under section 17(a),
though perhaps largely by historical happenstance. 123 Finally, an offer
to sell is sufficient to create a violation of section 17(a), whereas a
private Rule 10b-5 action requires a consummated sale (or
purchase).12 This last difference is also grounded in the text of
section 17(a).'2 Thus, the fact that the elements of section 17(a) and
Rule 10b-5 have often been treated similarly by the courts is not
dispositive of whether Janus should apply to the former.
Further, the precedents cited in Kellyl 26 for the proposition that
the elements of a section 17(a) claim and a Rule 10b-5 claim are
"essentially the same" all ultimately ground this proposition in the
similarities between the texts, 27 or their shared basis in common law
fraud." For example, the court in SEC v. First Jersey Securities Inc.'2 9
writes that "given the similarity of the text of § 17(a) of the Securities
Act to that of Rule 10b-5, we conclude that if a private right of action
exists under § 17(a), [plaintiff] has stated a claim upon which relief
statute imports the elements of common law fraud. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695-96(1980).
122. Aaron, 446 U.S. at 718 n.9 (" 'Because an SEC enforcement action is designed to
protect the public against the recurrence of violative conduct, and not to punish a state of
mind, this Committee intends that scienter is not an element of any Commission
enforcement proceeding.' " (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 10 (1977))).
123. See sources cited supra note 81.
124. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) ("[Section]
17(a), the antifraud provision of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a), expressly includes
'offer(s)' of securities within its terms while § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 do
not.").
125. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (proscribing certain behavior in the
"offer or sale" of securities).
126. SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing SEC v. Monarch
Funding Corp., 192 F.3d 295, 308 (2d Cir. 1999); SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d
1450, 1467 (2d Cir. 1996); SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 n.22 (2d Cir.
1968); SEC v. Power, 525 F. Supp. 2d 415,419 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
127. See, e.g., Monarch Funding Corp., 192 F.3d at 308 (citing First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101
F.3d at 1467); Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 855 n.22 (observing that the "provisions
of Sections 17(a) (2) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933... are virtually identical to the
provisions of Rule 10b-5(2) and (3) and were, in fact, the model therefor" but not
addressing the question of whether the elements are the same); Power, 525 F. Supp. 2d at
419 ("In general, to prove a claim under [Rule 10b-5 and Section 17(a)], the SEC must
show that the defendant: (1) committed a deceptive or manipulative act, or made a
material misrepresentation (or a material omission if the defendant had a duty to speak)
or used a fraudulent device; (2) with scienter; (3) which affected the market for securities
or was otherwise in connection with their offer, sale or purchase.").
128. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d at 1467 (" 'Since Section 17(a), like Section 10(b),
sounds in fraud, similar allegations are required to state a claim under that section.'"(quoting Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 507 F. Supp. 1225, 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981))).
129. 101 F.3d 1450 (2d Cir. 1996).
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may be granted against [defendant] under that section as well."130 The
similar treatment of section 17(a) and Rule 10b-5 is not an unbending
rule, but rather, a product of textual similarities. Relying on the
methodology used by the Supreme Court in Janus, the causes of
action may be treated differently to the extent that the texts differ.
Second, the Kelly court based its conclusion in part on the fact
that "the SEC's 'only purpose' in adopting Rule 10b-5 was to make
the same prohibitions contained in Section 17(a)-which applies in
connection with the 'offer and sale' of a security-applicable to
'purchasers' of securities as well."' ' The authority the court cites to
support this assertion, Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp. ,132 based its
conclusion on the claim that to create Rule 10b-5 "the Commission
simply copied Section 17(a), adding the words 'any person' in place of
'the purchaser' and a final clause 'in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.' "s3
However, this description misrepresents the textual differences
between the two provisions. Among other differences, section 17(a)
lacks the word "make" that the Supreme Court construed in Janus.134
To the extent that the SEC modified the text of 17(a) to adapt it for
Rule 10b-5, it did not perfectly copy the meaning of the statute.
Section 17(a) proscribes "obtain[ing] money or property," not making
misleading statements.3 5 The Supreme Court has held that where the
scope of the 10b-5 action is unclear, courts must "attempt to infer
'how the 1934 Congress would have addressed the issue had the 10b-5
action been included as an express provision in the [Exchange]
Act.' "136 The Court continued:
For that inquiry, we use the express causes of action in the
securities Acts as the primary model for the § 10(b) right of
action. The reason is evident: Had the 73d Congress enacted a
private § 10(b) action, it likely would have designed it in a
130. Id. (alterations in original) (citing Zerman v. Ball, 735 F.2d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 1984)).
Some courts previously recognized a private right of action under section 17(a), although
this view has since been rejected. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
131. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 345 (citing Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d
461,463 (2d Cir. 1952)).
132. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
133. Id. at 463.
134. See supra note 74.
135. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
136. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164, 178 (1994) (quoting Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Emp'rs Ins., 508 U.S. 286, 294
(1993)).
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manner similar to the other private rights of action in the
securities Acts.137
Therefore, to determine the scope of the judicially granted Rule lOb-
5 private right of action, courts should look to the scope of statutorily
granted rights of action. The Kelly court reverses this relationship by
looking to the scope of the judicially granted right of action under an
agency rule (Rule 10b-5) to determine the scope of a self-executing
statute enacted by Congress (section 17(a)). 13
Construing a statute enacted by Congress based on the text of a
rule subsequently promulgated by the SEC also leads to an absurd
conclusion: Had the SEC chosen to preserve the "to obtain" language
from section 17(a) when it created Rule 10b-5, the meaning of section
17(a) would now be different. After all, "to obtain" cannot plausibly
be interpreted to require ultimate authority."' In Janus, the plaintiff
argued that "making" statements meant "creating" the statements.'o
The court's reasoning in Kelly suggests that, had the SEC used the
phrase "to create statements" in place of "to make statements" in
Rule lOb-5, a creation requirement would have to be read into section
17(a) from the SEC rule. The Kelly court justified its interpretation
on the need to avoid "inconsisten[cy],"141 yet relying on a textual
construction of an agency rule to construe a statute that predates it
does not serve the purported goal of consistency. Even if it were
appropriate to construe 17(a) to look at the SEC's intent in drafting
Rule lOb-5, it cannot be said that the SEC's intent, much less its
authority, encompassed modifying the meaning of section 17(a),
which was enacted by Congress and had already been in effect for a
decade when Rule lOb-5 was promulgated. 42
B. Interpreting the Private Remedy Narrowly
The Supreme Court prefaced its argument in Janus with a
precaution concerning the need to interpret the lOb-5 private right of
action narrowly.14 3 After laying out its full argument, the Court
137. Id.
138. SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (reasoning that because
"the SEC's 'only purpose' in adopting Rule 10b-5 was to make the same prohibitions
contained in Section 17(a) ... applicable to 'purchasers' of securities," section 17(a) has
the "same functional meaning [when] it comes to creating primary liability").
139. See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 117.
142. See Freedman Remarks, supra note 77, at 922.
143. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011)
("[Ijn analyzing whether [Janus] 'made' the statements for the purposes of Rule lOb-5, we
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reiterated that its ultimate authority requirement "accords with the
narrow scope that we must give the implied private right of action."'"
This unwillingness to expand the private right of action seems to be
the Court's main rationale for imposing an ultimate authority
requirement.14 1 The Court's precedents rely on two arguments to
justify a narrow interpretation of Rule 10b-5. First, the Rule 10b-5
private right of action is vulnerable to abuse by plaintiff lawyers who
would use it to extort settlements from defendants for non-
meritorious claims.14 6 Thus, the private right of action creates the
potential for vexatious litigation. In contrast, there is no section 17(a)
private right of action and, therefore, this justification for imposing an
ultimate authority requirement does not apply to that statute. 47
Second, the Court argued that the Rule 10b-5 private right of action
must be interpreted narrowly because "Congress did not authorize
[the private right of action] when it first enacted the statute and did
not expand it when it revisited the law."1 as In contrast, the SEC's
authority to bring actions under section 17(a) is not implied by the
judiciary but rather expressly granted by Congress in the text of the
statute.14 9 Thus, this second justification for limiting the scope of Rule
10b-5 is not applicable to section 17(a).
are mindful that we must give 'narrow dimensions ... to a right of action Congress did not
authorize when it first enacted the statute and did not expand when it revisited the law.' "
(quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 165
(2008))).
144. Id. at 2303.
145. As the dissent points out, while the majority grounds its decision in the text of
Rule 10b-5, the use of the word "make" in the rule does not compel the requirement that
liability be limited to parties with "ultimate authority" over a statement. Id. at 2307
(Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The English language does not impose upon the word 'make'
boundaries of the kind the majority finds determinative."). Likewise, the Court's
insistence that precedent compelled its decision is questionable. Id. at 2307-08. One
commentator has argued that decisions on issues of securities law by the Roberts Court
have been driven more by a preoccupation with "maintaining the status quo" than by a
consistent methodology. A.C. Pritchard, Securities Law in the Roberts Court: Agenda or
Indifference?, 37 J. CORP. L. 105, 145 (2011).
146. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164, 189 (1994) ("[L]itigation under Rule 10b-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness
different in degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in general."
(quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975))). But see
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007) (recognizing that
"meritorious private actions to enforce federal anti-fraud securities laws are an essential
supplement to criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement actions").
147. See SEC v. Daifotis, No. C 11-00137 WHA, 2011 WL 3295139, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 1, 2011) (claiming that "Janus itself was limited to claims of primary violations of
Rule 10b-5"), modified on reconsideration, 2011 WL 3295139 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011).
148. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302 (quoting Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 165 (2008)).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
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C. Preserving the Distinction Between Primary and Secondary
Liability
The third justification that the Supreme Court gave for imposing
the ultimate authority requirement was that it was necessary to
preserve the distinction between primary and secondary liability in
Rule 10b-5 actions.' In Central Bank, the Court ruled that there was
no aider and abettor liability under Rule 10b-5.m1' The Janus Court
reasoned that recognizing liability for parties that do not have
ultimate authority for statements would allow plaintiffs' lawyers to
perform an end run around Central Bank's prohibition on secondary
liability." 2 Hence, if the test were made any less stringent, then
"aiders and abettors would be almost nonexistent," and Central
Bank's purpose to limit the reach of the private cause of action would
be defeated 5 3
Yet, as discussed in the previous section, the judicial imperative
to limit a right of action that Congress never explicitly granted does
not apply to section 17(a) since there is no implied private right of
action under that statute.s' The SEC can hold both primary and
secondary actors liable under section 17(a)-so distinguishing
between the two serves no useful purpose here-while allowing
culpable parties who act through an innocent intermediary to avoid
liability."15
The other reason that the Court in Central Bank gives for
declining to recognize secondary liability under Rule 10b-5 is that
"the rules for determining aiding and abetting liability are unclear, in
an area that demands certainty and predictability" because of the
potentially high costs to business.s 6 In making its decision, the Court
was concerned with the likelihood that legal uncertainty would
multiply future litigation since parties are more likely to litigate
150. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303.
151. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 180. Congress later restored the SEC's ability to bring
Rule lOb-5 claims against aiders and abettors. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 173.
152. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
153. Id.
154. See supra Part III.B.
155. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
156. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 188 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Arthur Delibert & Gregory Wright, The Supreme Court's Janus Decision: No
Secondary Liability, but Many Secondary Questions, 12 J. INVESTMENT COMPLIANCE 21,
22-25 (2011) (discussing contractual provisions, insurance, indemnification, and other
strategies for controlling litigation risk).
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uncertainties."' This phenomenon has certainly been at play in Rule
10b-5 claims since Central Bank was decided, as plaintiffs' attorneys
have tested various theories for broadening the scope of primary
liability under that rule.158
In contrast, in the context of section 17(a), the danger of
uncertainty for business is much less acute because all litigation is
coordinated through the SEC and the Department of Justice.'5 Nor
does rejecting an ultimate authority standard for section 17(a)
foreclose the possibility that the courts might articulate a different
rule for distinguishing between primary and secondary actors in that
context. A different rule for 17(a) claims could create consistency
without hampering the SEC's enforcement activities by exempting
some culpable actors from liability.160
D. The Reliance Element
The final support the Supreme Court offered for imposing an
ultimate authority requirement on Rule 10b-5 claims was its decision
in Stoneridge.'6' In Stoneridge, investors sued outside suppliers who
entered into fraudulent sales and purchases with the defendant
company, which allowed the company to mislead its auditor and
overstate its revenue. 6 2 The Court dismissed the case, reasoning that
the investors could not have relied on the fraudulent acts of the
suppliers since those acts had not been disclosed to the public.'' The
Court noted "nothing [the outside suppliers] did made it necessary or
inevitable for [the company] to record the transactions as it did."t"
However, as the dissent in Janus notes, Stoneridge is a case about the
reliance element of a lOb-5 claim.165 Reliance is not an element of a
157. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 189 ("The issues would be hazy, their litigation protracted,
and their resolution unreliable. Given a choice, we would reject any theory . . . that raised
such prospects." (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 755
(1975))).
158. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice, Scheme Liability: Does It Have a Future After
Stoneridge?, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 351, 352-53 (2009) (describing plaintiffs shift from section
(b) to sections (a) and (c) of 10b-5).
159. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 739-41 (reasoning that there is a special danger
of vexatious litigation for the private right of action under Rule 10b-5).
160. See infra CONCLUSION.
161. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2303-04
(2011).
162. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 152-53
(2008).
163. Id. at 152-53, 159.
164. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303 (quoting Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 161).
165. Id. at 2309 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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17(a) claim, so it is immaterial for purposes of section 17(a) whether
an investor relied on, or was even harmed by, a misrepresentation.xe6
The SEC need not prove reliance because the purpose of the
securities Acts and the agency's enforcement power under
section 17(a) encompass not only investor protection but also
"achiev[ing] a high standard of business ethics" to protect "honest
business" and promote a healthy economy.'67 Consequently,
Stoneridge's holding that plaintiffs could not have relied on
defendants' misrepresentations where it was not "necessary or
inevitable" for the company to act as it did is irrelevant to section
17(a) and does not justify imposing an ultimate authority standard.
CONCLUSION
In its recent decision in Janus, the Supreme Court held that to be
found liable for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5(b) defendants must
have had ultimate authority over allegedly false statements. Despite
the similarities between Rule 10b-5 and section 17(a), the Court's
analysis in Janus does not support extending the ultimate authority
standard to claims brought under section 17(a)(2). Most importantly,
there are significant textual differences between the two provisions.
Further, other considerations also do not weigh in favor of imposing
an ultimate authority standard on section 17(a)(2) claims. While
requiring ultimate authority for Rule 10b-5(b) claims arguably
reduces vexatious litigation and legal uncertainty, this benefit does
not accrue equally to section 17(a) since it lacks a private right of
action.1 " The need to distinguish between primary and secondary
actors in the context of 17(a) is less acute because the SEC may bring
claims under both theories of liability.169 Meanwhile, the innocent
conduit of fraud loophole identified by the dissent in Janus applies
equally to section 17(a) defendants. 70 Finally, limiting the SEC's
ability to pursue anti-fraud actions may be contrary to the remedial
role Congress envisioned for the legislation.'7 For these reasons, in
166. See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 158-59 (dismissing lob-5 claim since plaintiffs could
not have relied on "deceptive acts ... not communicated to the public"); Langevoort,
supra note 31, at 2127.
167. United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)).
16& See supra Part III.B.
169. See supra Part III.C.
170. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
171. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)
("Congress intended securities legislation enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds to be
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the absence of clear evidence that the Supreme Court intended its
decision in Janus to apply more broadly, the holding in that case
should be limited to Rule lOb-5 and not injected into other provisions
in the securities Acts.172 The textual analysis used by the Court in
Janus suggests that where section 17(a)(2) is concerned, courts should
focus on whether the defendant used a false statement "to obtain
money or property," rather than whether he made the statement."'
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construed 'not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial
purposes.' " (quoting Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at 195)).
172. See Pritchard, supra note 145, at 145 (arguing that the concern of the Roberts
Court in securities law is "maintaining the status quo").
173. Cf SEC v. Daifotis, No. C 11-00137 WHA, 2011 WL 4714250, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 7, 2011) (requiring the plaintiff in a 10b-5 lawsuit to allege that the defendant
"obtained money or property" through the sale of securities), modified on reconsideration,
2011 WL 3295139 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011).
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